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DISCUSSION AFTER THE SPEECHES OF CHARLES CACCIA
AND MATTHEW SCHAEFER
QUESTION, PROFESSOR CHODOSH: What can we do to ensure better
accountability as we move toward various forms of supranational organizations and institutions? Are there any strategies that you would offer for
achieving greater accountability within international systems?
ANSWER, MR. CACCIA: If I had the answers, I would not be here. Obviously, there is no answer that one can invoke quickly. This is why we need
conferences of this kind to raise this question and stretch our thinking. Evidently, we all want the transfer of sovereignty because there are some very
good reasons for it. The ironic part of this is that environmental movements,
for instance, are very much in favor of international agreements like the
Kyoto Protocol.' When it comes to environmental matters, that is fine. But
when it comes to international trade, the very same groups become very
nervous, and sometimes are very much opposed to a similar trend.
It is the country that makes them go one way or the other. I suppose this
happens to all of us individually, depending on the content of the proposal.
But if, intellectually, we are committed to sovereignty, to the transfer of sovereignty, and to moving to a regime whereby we have a form of government
that takes into account the necessities imposed by global issues like climate
change, then we have to improve our capacity to maintain accountability in
the new laws that we create. Evidently for some, it indicated the transparency
which Mr. Rosenthal mentioned earlier this morning, and that will help. But
there must be ways for these newly created bodies, like the ones in charge,
for instance, of the Kyoto Agreement and the WTO, to provide the public
with a sense that, if their action and their decisions are not acceptable, their
respective governments will still have a say in the implementation of their
decision. In the end, it is the state that has to ensure that the social cohesion
of the country is not affected by international decision, and that can be done.
But the public has lost confidence in these distant policies, particularly in
Europe, because their elected representatives do not seem to be able to control and to enforce, and have a say in the commission's decision.
In the case of Ethyl Corporation, we are looking at ourselves and feeling
like a bunch of idiots because we passed this legislation two years ago. Now,
we are beginning to wonder if the whole agreement is worth having if our
I United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 LL.M.
22(1998).
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own Parliament's legislation can be contested and taken to a panel of three
very distinguished Canadian citizens (one of whom is a former senator,
Gaston Gay, another one is a former premier of Ontario, Bob Rae, and the
third one I do not remember). They are to listen, examine, and then make
recommendations about whether Ethyl has a case or not. In the meantime, the
Parliament of Canada can just sit and wait for another couple of years.
ANSWER, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: Let me just say a word quickly
on legitimacy and sub-federal governments. Sub-federal government compliance is very important. States and provinces are huge economic actors in the
world. My research assistant put together a list of hypothetical economic
jurisdictions. If you treated states and provinces as separate nations, Ohio
was the twenty-fourth largest economic jurisdiction in the world. California
was seventh, and New York was tenth. You find twenty to twenty-five states
in the top fifty jurisdictions. You also find a couple of provinces, Ontario and
Quebec. Their compliance with these rules is as important to world welfare
as compliance by some nations.
Just to tie in with what the previous panel mentioned, what is the difference between late international law and national law? Does international law
enter the domestic legal system in terms of enforcement mechanisms here in
the United States? Only the federal government can sue the states for noncompliance with WTO obligations. Private parties cannot sue. The federal
government is very reluctant to do so. They are not anxious to do so at all.
Therefore, we really need states to voluntarily comply. This raises the importance of the WTO system being seen as "the given" in the eyes of some
sub-federal governments. How do we raise that legitimacy?
I think we have already taken several steps. Both the NAFTA implementing bill and the WTO implementing bill require state involvement in
dispute settlement cases. One reason maybe why Beer II has not been implemented as well as it should have been by the states is because they were
not involved. They were upset about their lack of involvement in that case.
With future disputes, the federal government is required to involve states. So,
that is just one way by which we can enhance the legitimacy of the WTO in
the eyes of state governments. We are going to need to do so because the
federal government does not seem to be too anxious to confront the states on
some of their violations.
COMMENT, MR. CACCIA: In Canada's case, the problem is the reverse. We have three provinces who are joining Ethyl Corporation in this
action: Alberta, Quebec, and Saskatchewan. They are taking issue with the
decision on the involvement of Canada.
COMMENT, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: I actually had a conversation
last night over dinner with someone from the finance ministry on the issue of
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investment attraction subsidies by states and localities. Currently, there are
not many constraints to that activity. Look at the whole range of constraints
within the U.S. system, especially state constitutional constraints. There are
provisions, such as prohibitions on special legislation, that would arguably
prohibit this. But state courts see themselves in a prisoner's dilemma. They
do not want to injure their states economically. So those provisions do not
constrain them. The dormant Commerce Clause similarly has this market
participant exception. It does not constrain it sufficiently.
We talked last night at dinner about the WTO constraints. There are certain constraints that may apply. But again who can complain? Private parties
cannot complain; only governments can complain. Ultimately, we are left in
a system where there are no such constraints on these wasteful and distorted
investment contraction subsidies by state governments. I think the same is
probably true for the provinces as well.
QUESTION, MR. WOODS: This may be outside the jurisdiction of the
panel, and it may pre-empt later conversations, but I am curious, given the
panel's obvious concern with provincialism or more power by sub-nationals,
and given their comments about the central government's reluctance to go
too far in addressing those issues, and looking at what is happening in
Europe with the European Union, I wonder if the panelists could comment on
looking at sovereignty in the other direction. Perhaps because of our very
different constitutional setups, it is possible to envision the possibilities and
the problems involved in looking at some kind of North American Union
based on the European model, which I think would be looking into the 21st
century and beyond.
ANSWER, MR. CACCIA: I think it would be a serious mistake to think
that the European model could be transplanted to North America, if I understand the question. The European model has a completely different economic
history and cultural and linguistic makeup.
There is a coming together of very clearly defined separate entities that
are working together and have no fear whatsoever of losing identity in terms
of the cultures and languages. But, in the case of North America, the conditions are very different in an historical perspective and very far apart. The
principal motive for Europe is to prevent another war and to bring to an end
the conflict started in France and Germany. So there are completely different
forces and pressures at play that are driving this phenomenon. In North
America, for example, the free movement of labor is something to think
about right now, particularly in the U.S./Mexico relationship. I do not know
whether that would ever happen.
For instance, we in North America have something that the Europeans do
not fear at all, but we fear it in Canada. That is the issue of the distribution of
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Time, Life, and Sports Illustrated.This is something that has troubled us, and
it has been a matter of front-page headlines in Canada. But we feel very
strongly about it due to cultural and linguistic reasons and we believe that is
a decision which is hurting us considerably.
COMMENT, MR. DUDLEY: This is more in the nature of a comment
than a question. I think it might tie together the issue of provincial and state
subsidies with that Ethyl Corporation case against Canada that has you and
others in Canada so excited.
I think it is important that we Canadians focus more on how important the
need is for investment protection in-other countries because our GEP is about
triple that of U.S. exports. We are an exporting country. We live and die by
investments and exports abroad and as more private partnerships become the
norm rather than traditional investments, particularly with the infrastructure
problem, we Canadians are going to benefit and are going to be very significantly exposed.
If we do not grant investment protections ourselves, or if we object to the
defense or to the exercise of investment protections when it is convenient to
us, or if we act angry about it, then we are not going to get those investment
protections from Mexico. We are not going to get them from other countries,
if that is in line with GATT's MAI and/or the investment protection agreement under the WTO. It is just too easy for Canada to shoot itself in the foot
by saying that the Ethyl Corporation is holding up our laws by objecting to
the fact that its investments have been, as it puts it quite properly, expropriated.
Frankly, I think Canada is going to win this one in a walk on the health
exemption, but we just cannot suck and whistle any more like that, particularly when we need investment protection. I am a private lawyer, and I do a
lot of international development work. I cannot even protect my clients because Canada has not signed the ICSID. So, we are going to lose unless we
Canadians accept the fact that it is a two-way street; if you want investment
protection, you have to grant it. And Mr. Caccia, if you wanted an easy case,
all Canada would have had to do is put through the Terminal Three expropriation bill and you would have one. We would have lost that one hands
down, because that was clearly expropriation.
The link to state subsidies, I think, comes up because the provinces have
a legitimate interest in getting involved so that they can protect their right to
bring in investments. But also, and this is a final comment, I certainly agree
that the level of abuse in the case of subsidization by states and provinces is
appalling. It is infinitely greater in the United States, partly because the U.S.
government does nothing to control it. I have clients in Canada thinking of
making investments in the United States who go around from state to state

Caccia & Schaefer-DISCUSSION

and ask, boys, what is your offer? And then, what I have to do is review these
offers to see if they qualify as subsidies under NAFTA, so that my Canadian
clients, when they re-import the U.S.-made products into Canada, do not get
sued by their Canadian competitors. Usually they are okay because these
states have incredibly sophisticated staffs of subsidy-avoidance lawyers,
economists, accountants, and everything else dreaming up ways to suck in
investment without it constituting accountable subsidies. Well, our provinces
in Canada cannot afford that kind of stuff. I know there are a lot of Washington lawyers who probably advise those state governments. In fact, I know
a couple of them who do and they give damn good advice.
QUESTION, PROFESSOR KING: I had a question on accountability. I
wanted to ask Mr. Caccia if we could have indirect accountabilities. You
mentioned the IMF, which is not accountable to anybody. The problem is the
structure of accountability. Can it be done indirectly through countries? You
said the important thing is that it has to appreciate its constituency. Is the
press a vehicle through which accountability can be established? You raise
the problem. Now I will have you solve the problem.
ANSWER, MR. CACCIA: That is why there is a Canada-United States
Law Institute, sir.
QUESTION, PROFESSOR KING: I think these dialogues are very important. But the problem is that the IMF sometimes acts in emergency situations, and the problem I am raising is how much checking back do you have
to do to respond to your question, which I think is appropriate?
ANSWER, MR. CACCIA: Sir, let me only say that like many other
things in life, it is not going to be an easy answer, and that we need our collective brains to explore and investigate and come up with the solution. It is
not an easy fix.
It is, however, a trend of our times. It is a very strong trend. We are aware
of it, and we are moving with it. We have to be aware that it is causing certain damages to the confidence of the public in the existing institutions and
their respective governments, if they are not strong enough to do what people
expect their governments to do, namely to come to their aid in times of need.
If certain measures related to trade, but including other human endeavors,
do cause damage to society, people in turn look at their government and expect something. And if the government says, sorry, but it was the IMF, or it
was the Geneva government, people are going to ask for a way to rectify the
situation and provide some evidence to show them that the government is
still in control. If the agreement is not good, you can change it. Surely certain
regional agreements would have to be changed eventually. The answer is not
going to be decided this morning. We will have to put our heads together.
This is not the place to raise the question, but why is it that the participation
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rate at election time is becoming lower and lower? Why is it declining, and
why is that not a concern to us? If it is related to the question of declining
accountability because of certain trends in the United Nations, then we have
an agenda.
QUESTION, MR. WENDLANDT: My name is Chris Wendlandt. Let me
ask this question.- In the European experience, it was perceived, I think, that
the European common market, being initially a trade arrangement, would fail
unless it was given a political dimension, out of which came the economic
union. And hence the question is whether or not trade arrangements, if they
are only trade arrangements, failed because the interest of the participants
changed over time, and, therefore, legitimacy could only be accomplished if
it was given a political dimension. Having said that, is there a need for a political dimension for NAFTA to succeed over time?
ANSWER, MR. CACCIA: It is a good question, but I do not know the
answer. We should discuss it, perhaps as a theme for the next conference.
QUESTION, MR. TUTTLE: My question is directed to Mr. Schaefer.
You seem to imply that the idea of governments being able to bring cases
before the WTO in some situations was not ideal. D you think that Kodak, in
the Fuji matter, would have fared better if they had gone before the WTO
with an army of attorneys and made their case?
ANSWER, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: Probably not. I do not think the
results in the Kodak case would have changed. But I think what happens is,
when you only have government-to-government dispute settlement, a lot of
political considerations obviously enter into play in terms of which cases are
brought and how they are approached. If you had economic interests that did
not take into account those political considerations, probably the enforcement
of trade agreement obligations would be greater.
There is a lot of talk about whether we ought to make international trade
agreement obligations directly applicable, self-executing in U.S. terminology, in domestic courts; namely, whether we should allow private parties to
bring claims in domestic courts for violations of international trade agreements. Most governments are not prepared for that. Some legal systems do
not allow for it. In other legal systems, there would be complications because
of a later-in-time federal enactment or an earlier-in-time treaty or earlier-intime implementing legislation for an international trade agreement.
I do not think it is a boiler plate solution to the problem. But we are
moving toward private parties bringing claims either before arbitration panels
or before domestic courts. I think NAFTA Chapter 11 is one example of how
the move is slowly occurring to allow private players more of a role in dispute settlement.

Caccia & Schaefer-DISCUSSION

COMMENT, MR. TUTTLE: If you do allow the private players to
eventually appear before the WTO, I imagine that would tie it up in an incredible knot.
COMMENT, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: I think, if it ever happens,
there will probably have to be some filtering mechanism developed. It is going to have to be a gradual evolution. The other problem is allowing private
parties to sue in national courts without divergent interpretation of trade terminologies by different national courts. So there is a whole host of complexities that need to be addressed and solved. There is a good article by
Thomas Cottier that appears in the new Journal of InternationalEconomic
Law that talks
about some of the problems with directive affect of trade
2
agreements.
ANSWER, MR. CACCIA: I go back for a moment to your very interesting question by only adding this. If you ask the man on the street in Europe
today to name his representative in the European Parliament in Brussels, nine
times out of ten, he will be unable to do so. When you ask the member of the
European Parliament why people do not know him, he is likely to say it is
because members of the Parliament have so little say. In the European Parliament, we have only an opportunity to execute parliamentary power when it
comes to the appointment of commissioners and commission members. Beyond that, our legislative power is very weak, very minimal. This is why the
Europeans talk about the famous democratic deficit. If we are to engage and
explore the possibility for North America, we will be advised to do that fully
aware and knowledgeable about the European experience so far, because it
does not seem to produce adequate results.
There are very deeply felt resentments in certain regions, particularly in
southern Europe, about the agricultural policies in Brussels, which were
made again by distant technocrats. Some countries have done extremely well,
but some have just been wiped out and their communities have, too. And the
result is, the system is not able to be effective. But your question nevertheless
is extremely valuable.

2 Thomas Cottier, The Relationship Between World Trade Organization
Law, National,

and Regional Law, 1 J. INT'L. ECON. L. 83 (1998).

